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Introduction
This chapter focuses on contractual royalties in the U.S. recording industry.
Developing Arewa’s (2019) research on entertainment industry contract accounting and
Stahl’s (2015) research on record industry royalty reform, we aim to shed light on
contractual accounting practices in the record industry and the structural asymmetries of
power that characterize them. Central to our analysis is the crucial but until now
unstudied role played by the Health and Retirement Funds (“AFTRA H&R Funds” or
“H&R Funds”) of the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (“AFTRA”)
in the economic lives of U.S. recording singers. The activities of this benefits system
include monitoring and auditing of singers’ compensation and royalty accounts. Archival
and other sorts of evidence documenting these activities provide a new and unique
window into otherwise obscure accounting and business practices. In part I, we discuss
the life and death of Mary Wells, a highly visible and successful recording artist in the
early years of Motown. We discuss how the Mary Wells case exemplifies key aspects of
the relationships among record companies, unions, and performing artists. In part II, we
discuss contractual accounting in light of the historical development of the cultural
industries. In part III, we outline AFTRA’s relationship with its recording singer
members, how singers’ recording contracts articulated individual and collective
bargaining, and how singers’ healthcare and pension accounts expressed the asymmetries
of record company royalty accounting. In part IV, we discuss the standard form and terms
of recording contracts of the 1950s and 1960s and some of the manipulative accounting
practices brought to light in the 1980s by “royalty reform” activists that were (and may
still be) central to business practice. In part V, we briefly examine the Moore case, a
major 1993-2002 lawsuit by aging singers against the H&R Funds, drawing on archival
evidence as well as contemporaneous trade journal coverage. We conclude by returning
to issues related to contractual accounting in the cultural industries. This chapter makes
use of unique sources and types of data that have not been utilized in relevant scholarly
literature and provides the first comprehensive examination of singers as union members.

I.

Mary Wells, AFTRA, and Recording Contracts

Mary Wells was the first Motown solo superstar and helped define the Motown
sound. Her enduring hit song “My Guy” made her popular worldwide. Mary Wells was
also an important representative of a broader social phenomenon in the late 1950s and
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early 1960s: her songs crossed a racial color line that had long been in place in the United
States. Because she was able to cross the recording industry racial color line, Mary Wells
“reached huge white and black audiences in America and England consistently and
repeatedly . . . she achieved an impressive career total of 20 top 100 hits. She was the first
artist on the Motown label to have a Billboard Top 10 and number 1 single, and she was
the first to record an album for that label.”1
Born in Detroit in 1943, Mary Wells died of cancer in Los Angeles in 1992.
Despite her notable successes, Mary Wells died in poverty. She did not have health
insurance, although she should have been entitled to receive coverage through AFTRA.
This lack of insurance no doubt contributed to her suffering as she fought against the
laryngeal cancer that ultimately contributed to her death. Following her diagnosis of
advanced cancer of the larynx in 1990, her initial medical expenses are conservatively
estimated to have been $140,000.2 After deciding to forgo the removal of her larynx
recommended by her doctors, Mary Wells underwent intensive radiation and was no
longer able to perform. Because her illness prevented her from performing, she did not
have income to pay her expenses; she was evicted from her townhouse, her phone was
shut off, and her car repossessed.3 The life and death of Mary Wells reveals critical
aspects of music industry institutional structures that have exploited singers and other
musicians, particularly but not only African American ones, in varied times and places
since at least the dawn of the recording industry.
The poverty and death of Mary Wells tell us about the contractual relationships
that pervade the recording industry and entertainment sector more generally. These
contractual relationships highlight the tenuous status of many artists by multiple
measures. For example, recording industry contracts reflect ambiguities about the work
status of performing artists, who receive certain benefits typically associated with being
an employee, as compared to an independent contractor. Performing artists, through their
union membership, may receive retirement and health insurance benefits, which are often
thought of as attributes of employment. Their contracts may refer to an employment
term.4 At the same time recording artists may not be treated as employees by other
measures, including at times issues related to control.5 Performing artists have long
exemplified issues related to employment status now widely associated with the digital
1

PETER BENJAMINSON, MARY WELLS: THE TUMULTUOUS LIFE OF MOTOWN'S FIRST SUPERSTAR ___
(2012).
2
Id. at 224, 230.
3
Id. at 230.
4
See, e.g., Exclusive Artist’s Recording Contract between MCA Records, Inc. and Olivia Newton-John
(April 1, 1975), Los Angeles County Archive; AFM Phonograph Record Contract between Capitol Records
and Nellie Lutcher (April 1, 1947) Howell Begle Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; as
well as agreements between Atlantic Records and Ruth Brown (June 2, 1958), the Drifters (May 10, 1959),
the Clovers (December 18, 1952), Joe Turner (February 15, 1954), and the Coasters (March 23, 1959),
Howell Begle Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
5
V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker Identities, 105 CAL.
L. REV. 101, 110-111 (2017) (noting that “the legal definitions and doctrinal tests demarcating the protected
employee in federal, state, and municipal work laws are indeterminate” and discussing legal and doctrinal
tests under federal, state law, and municipal laws).
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era gig economy. The term “gig” comes out of contexts of musical performance as a
slang term for a short engagement.6 Well before the advent of the digital-era gig
economy, many performing musicians were living in precarious, catch-as-catch-can
conditions, presaging the nature of work and employment arising in today’s gig
economy.7
Recording industry contracts also underscore economic relationships and
processes that may contribute to poor economic outcomes for many artists. Performing
artists such as Mary Wells are members of unions that ultimately exercise little effective
control over the individual terms of the contracts such recording artists sign with record
labels. Unions do play a role, however, in creating plans under collective bargaining
agreements that provide recording singers and other performers retirement and medical
benefits due them. Since 1959, under AFTRA’s Code of Fair Practice for Phonograph
Recordings (or Phono Code, known today as the Sound Recording Code), recording
companies have been required to make contributions to AFTRA’s Health and Retirement
Funds in proportion to royalties and other compensation paid to artists.8 In the case of
1960s recording artists, AFTRA did not adequately monitor or enforce recording
companies’ compliance with payment obligations to the health and retirement funds.
Mary Wells’s health policy was said to have been cancelled by mistake, and the union
eventually paid for much of her medical treatment.9 In addition to assistance with medical
costs, Mary Wells needed money to cover living expenses. She received support from
other artists and institutions, including Joyce and Sam Moore, the Rhythm & Blues
Foundation, Bruce Springsteen, Anita Baker, the Temptations, Rod Stewart, Diana Ross,
Aretha Franklin, Berry Gordy, Bonnie Raitt, Martha Reeves, Phil Collins, Robert De
Niro, Frank Sinatra, Smokey Robinson, Stevie Wonder, and Gladys Knight. Friends and
fans had raised a total of $150,000 by September 1991.10

6

James Bau Graves, The Original Gig Economy, Many Futures of Work: Possibilities and Perils 2018
Conference, https://www.futuresofwork.org/s/Graves-Orig-Gig-Econ-II.pdf.
7
Elka Torpey and Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2016,
https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/pdf/what-is-the-gig-economy.pdf. Social histories of
music-making stress the everyday vulnerability of medieval performers in terms likely familiar to workers
in today’s Uberizing economy: “To be a Spielmann,” a medieval singer not affiliated with a court or
employed by a town, “meant to lead a restless existence. [A]s the weaker one [in any social relation], he
had to surrender himself to a fate without being able to plan his life rationally. He had to forego striving for
a solid existence.” WALTER SALMEN, “THE SOCIAL STATUS OF THE MUSICIAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES” at 26,
in THE SOCIAL STATUS OF THE PROFESSIONAL MUSICIAN FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE 19TH CENTURY.
8
Section 30 of the 1959 Code, the first to cover recording singers under the Health and Retirement Funds,
mandates that each company annually makes to the Funds “a payment equal to 5% of the gross
compensation actually paid to an artist by the company in respect of services (including rehearsal) rendered
by him”; “gross compensation” is subsequently defined as “including salaries, earnings, royalties, fees,
advances, guarantees, deferred compensation, proceeds, bonuses, profit-participation, shares of stock,
bonds, options and property of any kind or nature whatsoever paid to the artist directly or indirectly or to
any other person, firm, entity or corporation on his behalf, and/or whether paid during the term of this Code
or the artist’s individual agreement with the Company regardless of the continued existence of this or
successor Code.”
9
BENJAMINSON supra note 1, at 231.
10
Id. at 233.
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Performing artists such as Mary Wells sign agreements with record labels that
typically entitle the artists to royalties based on unit sales and, often, other income
streams, at rates set out in the contract. The record labels calculate the amounts due to
performing artists under such contracts but are far from neutral parties in this process. As
will be discussed in this paper, royalty calculations can often be complex, nontransparent
and amenable to flexible interpretations of contractual accounting. Further, record labels
have incentives that may ultimately work against performing and other artists. Notably,
record companies benefit when they are able to use techniques of contractual accounting
for royalties that shift money due to artists to the record companies themselves.
The work status and contractual relations of performing artists have long been
issues of contestation. Arguments over record royalties have been common events in the
recording industry since the earliest days of the commercial recording industry.11
Recording industry firms have historically exploited rural artists and have used
exploitative tactics with multiple generations of African American artists.12
Recording artists regularly assert that record companies underpay them; if a
company sees continuing profitability in the artist, the assertion might lead to a
renegotiation of certain contractual terms. An artist might be able to hire an auditor—if
she or he is wealthy enough—individual artist audits are expensive, time-consuming and
severely limited by company policy to only certain forms of documentation. One thing is
certain: decades’ worth of assertions and audits have not notably altered opaque royalty
accounting practices that continue to be the norm in the recording industry. Recording
industry firms typically pay no penalty for underpayment of contractual royalties; the
most a company can be compelled to do is to pay what can be showed as owing, and even
then the typical result is settlement of less than one hundred cents on the dollar.13
11

Exploitation of musicians and disputes about royalties had emerged by the early blues era. In the case
Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 6110, 611 (1979), the heirs of the late Bessie Smith, one of the luminaries of
the early blues era, sued Columbia Records, Inc. and its parent corporation, CBS, Inc., alleging that all
recording contracts and copyright agreements entered into by Smith and Columbia between 1924 and 1933
“are invalid because of their unconscionability and Columbia’s overreaching . . . and were the product of
race discrimination.” In the mid-1930s, folk/blues singer-songwriter Huddie Ledbetter (also known as Lead
Belly) threatened to sue folklorist John Lomax for nonpayment of royalties under a management contract
Ledbetter signed with Lomax. Ledbetter and Lomax settled their dispute. Brian Lukasavitz, Blues Law:
Lead Belly vs. Lomax, American Blues Scene, Jan. 13, 2014, https://www.americanbluesscene.com/blueslaw-lead-belly-vs-lomax/; NOLAN PORTERFIELD, THE LAST CAVALIER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN A.
LOMAX 365-366 (1996); see also Robert Springer, Folklore, Commercialism and Exploitation: Copyright in
the Blues, 26 POPULAR MUSIC 33, 39 (2007) (“The socio-economic position of African-Americans in the
South, their frequent illiteracy and the fact that they were novices in the world of commercial music, made
them easy prey who could be exploited without contract or persuaded to sign away their rights.”) (citations
omitted); Amy Absher, Traveling Jazz Musicians and Debt Peonage, 37 AM. MUSIC 172, 176 (2019)
(discussing an instance in the 1930s of debt peonage, a form of enslavement in which traveling jazz
musicians “were offered the opportunity to work or face the alternative to labor: starvation, imprisonment,
and violence.”).
12
Springer, supra note 11; Stephen Calt, The Anatomy of a “Race” Music Label: Mayo Williams and
Paramount Records, in RHYTHM AND BUSINESS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC 86 (Norman
Kelley ed., 2002).
13
KEVIN MURRAY ARTICLE
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The union status of singers has varied over time. Since 1951, recording singers
have been covered by the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (or
AFTRA, which merged with the Screen Actors Guild in 2012 to form SAG-AFTRA)
under the Phono Code. Unions such as SAG-AFTRA negotiate and enforce collective
bargaining agreements. These collective bargaining agreements guarantee minimum
(never maximum) salaries, set standards for safe working conditions, and set health and
retirement benefits.14 The negotiating power of recording artists and economic terms of
such contracts vary significantly but are within the guarantees established by AFTRA if
they meet the Phono Code’s requirements. However, although AFTRA contracts include
procedures for binding arbitration, AFTRA does not resolve disputes between recording
singers and record companies. As a result, the essential economic terms of the
relationship between the recording singer and recording company are largely unregulated
by AFTRA.
The AFTRA Health and Retirement Funds are a system of employee benefits tied
directly to individually- and collectively-bargained forms of wage and non-wage
compensation related to work in a group covered by AFTRA. Recording singers are just
one of several groups covered by AFTRA; other groups include performers in radio,
television, and advertising. To claim healthcare and pension benefits, union members
must meet and/or maintain certain earnings thresholds by working for signatory
companies.15 Signatory companies fund individual healthcare and pension accounts
through annual contributions equal to a percentage of each performer’s earnings for that
year.16 AFTRA H&R Funds monitor and enforce company contributions and administer
collectively-funded healthcare and retirement plans. This system was established in the
1950s for each of AFTRA’s employee groups through collective bargaining.17
AFTRA H&R Funds are an entirely employer-funded “multi-employer pension
plan,” the first of its kind in the cultural industries.18 More significantly, by including
record royalties along with wages and residuals as the basis for determining eligibility
and amounts of health and retirement benefits available to performers, the union and
signatory companies created a private enforcement system for the royalty terms in
individually-bargained agreements between performing singers and recording companies.
The AFTRA H&R Funds’ structure created an entity that was legally separate from both
the signatory companies and the union, governed by a board of trustees with A) much
14

American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, The People Who Entertain and Inform,
https://web.archive.org/web/20120306194259/http://www.aftra.org/8B5287F230CD40458B2B226EAECF
FD5C.htm.
15
These thresholds are among the many terms covered in rounds of bargaining between the union and
employer groups in each sector and were regularly published in AFTRA’s “Your Benefits” pamphlets
distributed to members (citation).
16
These rates too are among the many terms covered in rounds of bargaining between the union and
employer groups in each sector and were regularly published in AFTRA’s “Your Benefits” pamphlets
distributed to members (citation).
17
Rita Morley Harvey offers perhaps the only published account of this decade-long, multi-sector project.
See her Those Wonderful, Terrible Years: George Heller and the American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists, Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press (1996).
18
Id.
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greater power than individual singers, and B) a fiduciary obligation to enforce timely
royalty accounting and accurate payment by signatory companies.
Since 1959, under the Phono Code, recording contracts between singers and
signatory companies have obligated those companies to report individual singers’
earnings to AFTRA’s Health and Retirement funds, and to make annual payments to the
funds on behalf of each singer. H&R Funds contributions are subject to AFTRA
oversight and monitoring. Further, in 1974, the U.S. Congress passed the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),19 which expanded federal government
regulatory oversight over private-sector retirement plans.20 Little government regulation
of private pension plans existed prior to the passage of ERISA.21 ERISA establishes
fiduciary standards that require that employee benefit plans such as private pension funds
be handled prudently and in the best interests of plan participants; more specifically,
ERISA fiduciaries have duties, including the duty of loyalty, duty of care, and duty to act
in accordance with plan documents.22 The AFTRA Health and Retirement Funds Trust is
an ERISA fiduciary.23 The Health and Retirement Funds Trustees have significant power
to make determinations about benefits to be paid to AFTRA singers and are authorized to
make compromises, settlements, and releases of claims, and construe the provisions of
the Trust Agreement.24 Constructions of the Trust Agreement rendered in good faith are
“binding” on AFTRA and the record companies.25 AFTRA, as a fiduciary, has a legal
obligation meet the requirements of the duty of care toward members.
Determination of the amounts due to recording singers and such singers’
eligibility for AFTRA benefits require understanding of the payment terms in contracts
between such artists and record companies. Issues emerging from such contracts are at
the core of myriad industry disputes today. Their legal status empowers the Funds to
examine record companies’ books. Insofar as it documents the H&R Funds’ monitoring
and enforcement activity, the AFTRA archive concentrates a great deal of relevant
evidence concerning the routine practices of major and minor record companies, offering

19

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).
Rebecca J. Miller, Robert A. Lavenberg & Ian A. Mackay, ERISA: 40 Years Later, J. ACCOUNTANCY,
Sept. 1, 2014, https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2014/sep/erisa-20149881.html.
21
James G. McMillan, III, Misclassification and Employer Discretion under ERISA, U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 837, 841 (2000).
22
Patrick Purcell & Jennifer Staman, Summary of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
(RS34443) CRS 1, 27-33 (2008). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/ 505/.
23
The AFTRA health and retirement funds were established pursuant to an Agreement and Declaration of
Trust between AFTRA, the record companies, and other entities. This agreement created two funds, a
health fund and a retirement fund, and twenty trusteeships, the Funds Trustees, which positions are held by
10 individuals chosen by record companies and 10 individuals chosen by AFTRA. Moore v. AFTRA, supra
note ___, at 3; see also AFTRA Retirement Plan, Form 5500, Annual Return/Report of Employee Benefit
Plan for Plan Year End Nov. 30, 2017 (2016); AFTRA Health Plan, Form 5500, Annual Return/Report of
Employee Benefit Plan for Plan Year End Jan. 1, 2017 (2016).
24
Moore v. AFTRA, supra note ___, at 3.
25
Id.
20
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an extraordinary window onto the otherwise carefully-guarded contractual accounting
practices of the U.S. recording industry of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

II. Contractual Accounting and the Rise of the Cultural Industries
The contractual accounting practices at issue in the Moore case are just one type
of measurement used by recording firms and are important for understanding outcomes
for performing artists. Firms employ accounting measurements for various purposes
within the firm, including to account for firm activities as a whole. Contractual
accounting practices are best understood within the context of firm accounting practices
generally.26
Entertainment industry firms effectively keep two sets of books,27 one related to
financial accounting at the firm level and the other based on industry contracts
(contractual accounting).28 Financial accounting is reflected in public presentations of
industry financial statements and is typically subject to various oversight mechanisms,
including audits and, in some instances, mandatory securities law disclosure
requirements. Contractual accounting reflects special accounting treatments created
within an industry that are used to account for contractual payments owed to industry
participants. In the cultural industries, the contracts upon which contractual accounting is
based reflect industry power hierarchies and are used by cultural industry firms to, among
other things, make determinations about how to apply costs to a particular contract and
whether royalties should be payable to a particular artist.
Contrasts between financial statement accounting at the firm level and contractual
accounting for individual contracts highlight ways in which accounting practices, which
rarely are closely examined in other than a highly technical manner, are at the heart of the
modern business enterprise. Financial statements, which have become a common
language of business and basis for myriad business practices, are widely used by multiple
audiences. For example, those within companies use financial statements for varied
purposes, including for planning, monitoring, and compliance purposes, while regulators
and investors use company financial statements for varied purposes.
Financial statement accounting became increasingly standardized in the context of
nineteenth and twentieth century industrial enterprises.29 However, industrial enterprises
were not the only businesses to flourish during the nineteenth century. The development
mass media, led by the publishing industry, accelerated in connection with a growing
26

[Olufunmilayo B. Arewa & Matt Stahl, Accounting, Accountability, and Singers’ Royalties, Working
Draft, July 2019].
27
Companies also typically keep a separate set of books for tax purposes. Tax accounting will not be
discussed in this chapter. See Celia Whitaker, How to Build a Bridge: Eliminating the Book-Tax
Accounting Gap, 59 TAX LAWYER 981, 982-985 (2006).
28
Reed Abelson, The Shell Game of Hollywood 'Net Profits': DreamWorks May Be Shaking Up Some
Time-Honored Accounting Habits, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 1996, www.nytimes.
com/1996/03/04/business/shell-game-hollywood-net-profits-dreamworks-may-be-shaking-up-some- timehonored.html.
29
Arewa & Stahl, supra note 26.
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body of copyright law,30 under which a mass market for books quickly arose.31 In this
context the relationships between authors and publishers grew increasingly complex as
financial stakes mounted. During the early development of the commercial book
publishing industry, contracts with authors were based on varying criteria. Publishing on
commission, which required that authors take the financial risk of their books,
flourished.32 In Britain, subscription became a popular publication method (after
patronage) in the late 1600s.33 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the half-profits
system was a risk sharing approach to publishing in which authors shared risk and agreed
to receive 50 percent of book sale revenues minus costs.34 The half-profit system was
abused by publishers who, “through misleading accounting and inflation of distribution
and production costs, could emerge with more profit at the expense of the author.”35
Publishers also bought author copyrights outright at a fixed price. In the late nineteenth
century, publishing contracts based on half-profits were giving way to what one author
has characterized as an “American” style royalty basis.36
As had been the case with books and the relation of author to publisher, the rise of
the printing press contributed to the transformation of old systems in music based on
patronage.37 Under the older patronal system, musicians were often attached to upper
class households.38 The marketization of music—exemplified by the 1760-1800 career of
Haydn, which spanned this transition—has been referred to as “emancipation” of
musicians from household service.39 As popular composers became market actors,
lawmakers became susceptible to demands for the extension of copyright.40 The
nineteenth century movement to a mass music market, at first for sheet music, was
likewise closely connected to the development of copyright law.41 One study of the
royalty ledgers of a British publishing company in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries found five types of royalty arrangements with authors, many of which remain
evident today: (1) outright purchase by publisher of the author’s copyright; (2) publisher
payment of a royalty; (3) publisher payment of a royalty with an advance; (4) publisher
30

Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75 (2003) (discussing early copyright debates and the origins of
conceptions of literary property, which is often seen as reflecting the settlement and enclosure of the literary
world).
31
ALEXIS WEEDON, VINCENT NEWEY & JOANNE SHATTOCK, VICTORIAN PUBLISHING: THE ECONOMICS OF
BOOK PRODUCTION FOR A MASS MARKET 1836-1916 at 31 (2016).
32
Leslie Howsam, Forgotten Victorians: Contracts with Authors in the Publication Books of Henry S. King
and Kegan Paul, Trench 1871-89, 34 PUBLISHING HIST. 51, 51 (1993).
33
FINKELSTEIN & MCCLEERY, supra note ___, at 76.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Howsam, supra note 32, at 51.
37
William Weber, Mass Culture and the Reshaping of European Musical Taste, 1770–1870, 25 INT’L REV.
AESTHETICS & SOC. MUSIC 175, 186 (1994).
38
Id. at 177-78.
39
See e.g. Salmen – social obligations of the emancipated musician; Petzoldt – economic conditions of 18th
c musicians; Carlton – changes in status and role-play: the musician at the end of the eighteenth century.
40
Kretschmer and kawohl
41
Id. at 177-78; Jane A. Bernstein, Printing and Patronage in Sixteenth-Century Italy, 16 REVISTA DE
MUSICOLOGÍA 2603 (1993); Weber, supra note 37, at 182 (citations omitted).
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payment of a royalty after a contribution from author for expenses; and (5) publisher
would publish at author’s expenses.42 Recording artists today would find these nineteenth
and early twentieth century compensation models familiar.
Copyright law and the effective control of content have provided key existential
conditions for media businesses, at least prior to the digital era. Compensation models in
music and other cultural industry firms have reflected sector-specific particularities of the
application of copyright. In the United States, recorded music typically involves two
distinct copyrights, one attaching to the musical composition, which includes musical
notation and any lyrics,43 the other to the sound recording.44 These two copyrights are
handled through two distinct systems. In typical music publishing agreements,
songwriters and composers assign all or a portion of the copyright in their musical
compositions to a music publisher; under most exclusive recording contracts, recording
artists assign their copyright in sound recordings containing their performances to a
record company. Assignments by songwriters/composers and recording artists are
typically made in exchange for promised payments of future royalties. Music publishers
exploit musical compositions and share income with composers according to copyrightconforming individual contracts and depend on copyright law for the protection and
enforcement of their rights. Royalties payable to composers and songwriters from public
performances of their musical compositions are collected and distributed by performing
rights organizations (PROs), which are a form of Collective Management Organization
(CMO). PROs collect payment from venues where music is performed, and typically
directly pay songwriters and composers their share of proceeds from public
performances.45 These organizations originated out of lobbying and self-protective efforts
by mid-nineteenth century composers; ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC are the primary PROs
in the United States.
By contrast, the intellectual property and compensation relations between
recording artists and record companies in the United States work differently and reveal
different assumptions. Prior to 1972, sound recordings were not protected by federal
copyright law and performers, even after enactment of copyright protection for sound
recording, did not receive performance rights similar to those of composers. Singers (or
the holders of the sound recording rights they assign) cannot control the uses of sound
recordings the ways that composers can scores. As a result, no royalty rights-based
interest groups have arisen in the United States to collect payments for singers, other
42

John R. Turner, J.W. Arrowsmith's Royalty Ledger, 48 PUBLISHING HIST. 85, 86 (2000).
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1946).
44
Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (amending the Copyright Act to
provide for the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings for various purposes, including protecting
against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recordings).
45
This means that unlike recording singers, songwriters and composers have a stream of revenue that may
not be subject to recoupment by the music publisher. Industry practice may, however, be changing, and
music publishers may be increasingly seeking to have payments due songwriters on account of public
performances pass through the music publisher to enable the publisher to recoup advances. See The Music
Publisher and Songwriter Relationship, RoyaltyExchange.com, January 4, 2018,
https://www.royaltyexchange.com/blog/the-songwriter-and-music-publisher-relationship-pt4#sthash.CaILamye.dpbs.
43.
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musicians, or other participants in the creation of sound recordings, such as producers.46
Further, performers’ rights that might otherwise be received through copyright or related
rights have in the United States have typically been incorporated in industry collective
bargaining arrangements.47
The enactment of the sound recording copyright and development of related rights
for performers reflect conceptions of musical authorship that see performers as nonauthors who make marginal contributions to works authored by others by virtue of their
interpretation of such works.48 Copyright and related rights in connection with sound
recordings reflect underlying assumptions about musical authorship that is inconsistent
with how music is actually created, particularly today.49
Although copyright is an important background factor in the relative allocation of
payments within the music industry generally, payments due recording artists are to a
significant degree defined by collective bargaining arrangements and the terms of
individual contracts such artists enter into with recording industry firms. Most artists
typically have little negotiating leverage in entering into contracts with recording
companies. Recording industry firms are also typically given contractual authority to
make determinations about payments to artists. The combination of disadvantageous
contractual terms, minimal negotiating power for most recording artists, and recording
industry companies’ ability to make determinations about payments to artists have
contributed to what can only be characterized by pervasive shortfalls for many recording
artists in both royalty payments and health and retirement benefits contributions. This
pattern is in part due to recoupment practices discussed below and inappropriate
allocation of costs to individual artist accounts in contractual accounting for royalty
46
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payments, which means that the effective royalty rate that an artist receives may be well
below the royalty rates identified in the contract.50

III. Unionized Recording Singers, Compensation, and Benefits
Individual recording contracts between performing artists and record companies
typically delineate the business relationship between the artist and the record company.
Such contracts typically entitle performing artists to varied types of payments, including
artist advances, privately-bargained royalty rights, hourly wages for recording sessions,
and other payments. As noted above, payments due to recording and other artists have
long been a subject of dispute. The Moore case, filed in October 1993 against AFTRA, a
number of signatory record companies, and the AFTRA H&R Funds, offers an important
window through which to evaluate issues related to recording artist compensation that
have long been contested.51
Evidence presented in this lawsuit and other settings strongly suggest that
recording industry firms have engaged in a systematic and longstanding pattern of underreporting and under-paying royalty payments to singers and that such firms also failed to
make required contributions to the AFTRA H&R Funds.52 These recording industry firm
practices appear to have been facilitated by inadequate monitoring and enforcement by
the H&R Funds. Moreover, evidence from AFTRA’s archive53 shows that H&R Funds
employees were aware of the problems addressed by the Moore lawsuit at least two years
before the singers brought AFTRA and the H&R Funds to court.
The status of singers within AFTRA and the music institutional landscape is
relevant to this legal case. AFTRA’s executive officers and bargaining teams established
the H&R Funds and made their health and pension plans available to qualifying
performers in all AFTRA sectors over the course of many rounds of bargaining between
1950 and 1960.54 Recording singers were the last group to be included in the H&R
Funds; the H&R Funds first appeared in the 1959-1962 Phono Code, negotiated in 1958.
Recording singers were also the smallest occupational group covered by AFTRA, and it
was not until the 1990s, after Sam Moore and his co-plaintiffs filed suit, that the H&R
Funds Board of Trustees included a single member with record-industry experience. In
the perspective of one director of the Funds, singers’ marginal status in AFTRA central to
their experience of royalty and benefits shortfalls.
Records companies’ annual contributions to AFTRA singers’ H&R accounts are
only one of several forms of extra-wage compensation characteristic of entertainment
unions’ collective bargaining agreements. Although such non-wage payments take
different forms for members in AFTRA’s different employee groups (and for members of
other Hollywood unions), they have in common the principle that certain (re)users of
existing recorded performances must make additional payments to the original
50
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performers. For example, when a television station or network rebroadcasts (or “reruns”)
old television programs that include AFTRA-covered performances, additional payments,
calculated as a percentage of their original performance fees/wages, must be made to
those AFTRA members who performed in the original video-recorded performances.
This is sometimes explained as compensation for the effects of reuses on the market for
new performances: when air-time can be filled by recordings, fewer new performances
are needed.55
Unlike singers’ royalties, residuals for television and radio performers are
negotiated and overseen by AFTRA (though AFTRA singers performing on TV or radio
do so under the TV and Radio Codes and are entitled to residual payments on the
occasions that those recordings are rebroadcast).56 Like royalties, residuals count as
“covered earnings” under the Phono Codes of the 1960s, meaning that they are part of a
performers’ annual gross compensation as defined by the Codes, the basis on which
companies’ contributions to benefits plans are calculated. The formulas for calculating
payments owing to original performers are core features of collective bargaining
agreements throughout the entertainment industry, and controversy over the scope and
rates of residual compensation have led to the majority of Hollywood performer labor
actions.57 Since their establishment in the Hollywood unions, these modes of
compensation have become central to the political economy of the U.S. entertainment
industry.58
Like residuals, AFTRA singers’ royalties reflect the continuing market value of
original performances, but unlike residuals, record company royalty obligations and rates
are established through individual negotiations between performers and record
companies. Royalties are not mandated collectively, and they can vary extremely—across
categories of singers at any given time, across singers’ careers, over years or decades, and
across other institutional lines. For the last two or three decades, royalty rates for
promising and established acts have been around 10-20%; Michael Jackson’s reported
(and possibly apocryphal) early 1980s rate of 42% has probably never been equaled, let
alone exceeded, by another artist signed to a major company.59 When Sam Moore and his
early 1960s R&B colleagues were signed, royalty rates typically ranged from 1-5%.60
The highly individualized and contingent nature of royalty agreements already suggests
that a benefit plan funded primarily (or even partly) through performers’ royalty income
will have a wide range of outcomes, even if reporting, contribution, monitoring, and
enforcement are relatively accurate and effective.
By 1959, each of AFTRA’s sector-specific collective bargaining agreements (the
various Codes of Fair Practice) required signatory companies to report, and to contribute
55
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annually a sum equivalent to a percentage of, each employee’s “covered earnings” each
year, to the AFTRA funds under the employee’s name. For recording artists, this amount
was initially set at 5%, all of which was payable by recording companies, with nothing
withheld or paid out of employees’ wages or other earnings. In the 1970s, the
contribution amount rose to around 10% and remained close to that level through the
early 1990s.
For most of AFTRA’s members—those working in broadcast and advertising—
this system appears to have worked pretty well. The reporting and monitoring of earnings
and the contribution and enforcement of payments were comparatively simpler when they
concerned regular, salaried employees, such as radio announcers or television actors,
whose earnings were easily tracked, or even calculable in advance. Moreover, residuals
payment rates were clearly set out in collective bargaining agreements, and the licensing
of an existing program or series was a complex but routine affair involving participants
from separate organizations in a regulated industry whose output could be comparatively
easily monitored.
Recording singers, working irregularly under AFTRA contracts, likely making
much more of their income through live performances, lacked such institutional “grids”
by which earnings and contributions could be as clearly rationalized, predicted, inspected,
or regulated. For reports and payments on royalty earnings the Funds depended entirely
on record companies’ accounting. As noted above, in the United States, no performing
rights organizations-like institutions arose to act as independent monitors or enforcers
with respect to the circulation and performance of sound recordings. Standard recording
contracts now provide for artist audits of amounts paid under contracts. But, then and
now, individual singers without the money to hire an auditor and/or attorney had little or
no effective means to check the timeliness or accuracy of company royalty accounting.
They had even less ability to verify the sufficiency or accuracy of recording company
contributions to the H&R Funds. The H&R Funds alone had the effective authority to
enforce companies’ contribution obligations, and therefore the authority to audit artist
royalty accounts and other artist earnings to assess the accuracy of H&R Fund
contributions. The 1993 Moore suit argued that, as a fiduciary, the AFTRA H&R Funds
should have exercised that power.
Signatory record companies were required to file earnings reports and make
Funds contributions within temporal windows set out in the Phono Code. Timeliness was
crucial: if the H&R Funds did not receive the required payment within a certain period,
then the earnings would not be credited to that period, and the performer might lose
healthcare coverage or pension credits or might be delayed in establishing eligibility for
benefits. (Funds trustees did have the authority to change or make more flexible that
policy, but, with the exception of a brief period to be discussed in future work, they did
not.) Affidavits filed in the Moore case by a former director and a former royalty expert
of the H&R Funds,—as well as internal memoranda and auditing documents—indicate
that record company contributions were usually late, and that companies would often pay
little or nothing until the H&R Funds audited or threatened to audit them.61 The
difficulties Mary Wells faced in obtaining health insurance benefits when she had
61
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advanced cancer and her death stood as an example of what many African American
R&B and soul singers could face should they be deemed ineligible for H&R coverage, as
Mary Wells had been.

IV. Recoupment and Recording Company Practices
For singers, the gaps between the AFTRA H&R Funds’ commitment to monitor
earnings and enforce payments (as established in the Phono Codes from 1959 on) and the
laxity of actual monitoring and enforcement (as later demonstrated by the Funds’
continual dependence on after-the-fact auditing) was only part of the problem. Perhaps
even more significantly, the H&R Funds’ accounting and enforcement system as it
concerned recording singers was shaped by and around the record industry contract
practices of the time. These practices, embedded in the wording and interpretation of
standard form contracts, favored record companies, often to absurd degrees. Recording
contracts of the 1950s (when the H&R Funds were instituted) and the 1960s (drafted in
context of record companies’ new plan obligations) were typically no more than three
pages long and had only a few basic features. Most contracts of that era are standard form
printed contracts with blank spots for artists names and room for only a few individuallynegotiated terms such as royalty rates, renewal options, and number of finished
recordings per unit time (quarter, year).62
This contractual form was built around one structure: recoupment, a core feature
of recording contracts. Standard form contracts and industry practice bound the company
to collect royalties in individual artist royalty accounts. When the amount collected
equaled the amount advanced by the company, the artist was “recouped” and could then
begin to receive royalties. Recoupment means that the company, the hiring party, is
entitled to be reimbursed—by the artist, out of her royalty income—for certain costs
associated with making a record (including her own wages), before the artist is entitled to
receive any royalties. The company adds the recoupable costs associated with each
recording by the singer to the singer’s royalty account such that no royalties will be paid
out until all recoupable costs associated with all the singer’s records have been recouped.
At the point the singer’s royalty account balance thus shifts from “negative” to
“positive,” the record company must pay accruing royalties, typically in the form of
checks issued along with biannual royalty account statements.
Recording companies typically advance amounts needed to cover recording costs,
including the singer’s guaranteed minimum wages, as well as costs incurred by the record
company for arranger/producer fees and employment of side musicians for recording
sessions. These costs are later recouped out of royalties due to an artist, which means that
an artist would not receive any royalties until the record company advance is recouped.63
In the 1950s, total costs for a small R&B label to record a “side” (a song—one side of a
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two-song, two-sided 45 or 78 rpm disc) could be as low as a few hundred dollars.64 The
advance, then, is effectively a loan to the artist (the artist’s liability, the company’s asset)
– which must be repaid out of royalty income before the artist herself is entitled to receive
any royalties. Contract language suggests that companies were obliged to account for
royalties due to the artist as long as her material was selling (and, later, as long as it was
selling or being licensed), and to pay royalties once she was finally “recouped.”65
From the 1960s on, processes of determining how much artists were due became
based on formulas that grew increasingly Byzantine and obscure.66 With the 1959 Phono
Code, AFTRA’s Health and Retirement Funds began to include singers. The problems
faced by aging AFTRA singers in the 1990s were likely foreseeable from the outset. The
H&R Funds grafted its processes of establishing and maintaining members’ benefits
accounts, and monitoring and enforcing employer contributions, onto a system of
advances, recoupment and royalty accounting that was already complex, nontransparent,
and engineered in the companies’ interest in the 1950s.
The emergence of R&B from a few urban centers, as dozens of small independent
record companies made records for racialized market segments ignored by the “majors”
of the 1940s and 1950s has been well studied.67 Many participants (entrepreneurs,
performers, and others) seem to have approached the R&B business as a potentially
profitable fad, ephemeral, without expectations of the kind of long-term popularity, sales,
and revenues now associated with pop music of that era. Yet artist royalty accounts,
concealed within corporate black boxes, seem to have been readily adaptable to business
needs and conditions. In the Moore case and other instances, recording companies appear
to have manipulated artist royalty accounts, using them as a means for hiding artists’
royalty incomes rather than as a mechanism for tracking or for ensuring timely and
accurate payments to artists. The degree to which these practices enabled the companies
to survive, compete, and, in some cases (e.g., Atlantic Records) become dominant firms,
has not yet been examined.
Routine manipulation of artist royalty accounts was perhaps first revealed in the
1980s, when aging R&B singers and their advocates publicly began pressuring
companies to account for irregular individual royalty statements and spotty or nonexistent payments. In some cases, singers had not received contractually-mandated
biannual royalty account statements from their companies for years (some had never
received any such statements).68 Companies’ failure to issue royalty statements, and their
aggressive resistance to performers’ royalty accounting-related inquiries, rang
increasingly false in light of the gathering popularity of nostalgic film soundtracks like
64
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American Graffiti, and the multiplying reissues of old material and newly-issued
compilation albums of “oldies,” often heavily advertised on television.69 Million-selling
soundtracks and popular reissues and “oldies” compilations offered aging singers
evidence of the continuing cultural value of their old recordings and news of their
continuing revenue-generating circulation, giving impetus to demands for accountability,
and increasing the reputational vulnerability of companies profiting in these markets.
From the late 1960s to the late 1980s, when artists and their advocates, seeking
unpaid royalties, contacted their record companies (or the companies that had purchased
them), company lawyers often told them that the singers had it all wrong. In one case
after another, it seems, the artists were in debt to the companies, and not the other way
around. For example, Atlantic Records warned Ruth Brown in 1969 that she owed them
$26,000, giving her the impression that if she didn’t stop pestering them, they would sue
her for the money.70 Such debts were typically in the tens of thousands of dollars—
Muddy Waters owed MCA (owner of Chess Records) $56,000 in 1986; Howlin’ Wolf
owed MCA/Chess nearly $44,000; and Carla Thomas owed Stax Records $80,000.
Company executives routinely asserted that such accounts reflected their forebears’
willingness continually to advance sums of cash to supposedly spendthrift singers.71 In
the early 1980s, against the backdrop of a booming nostalgia market, investigations by
artist advocates began to challenge official explanations of these startling debts.72
The efforts of Howell Begle, a prominent mergers and acquisitions attorney with
government and mass-media connections, working pro-bono on behalf of Ruth Brown
and many of her R&B colleagues beginning in the 1980s, were particularly effective.
Begle’s research demonstrated that whatever other purposes artist royalty accounts
served, they also served as sponges that could soak up company liabilities for costs that
were actually non-recoupable (i.e., costs that could not to be charged to artists according
to contract terms, such as promotion and packaging with respect to 1950s contracts), that
were nonetheless being passed on to artists.73 This shifting of costs transformed them
from liabilities (money owed or spent by the company on promotion, packaging, and
other non-recoupable costs, not to mention royalties owed to artists) to assets (money
purportedly owed to the company by the artist). Taking advantage of political support,
celebrity power, and Atlantic Records’ concern for its own reputation, Begle obtained
internal documents from Atlantic showing that the industry practice of larding royalty
accounts with unrecoupable business costs was routine in contractual royalty accounting
for 1950s R&B artists.74
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Howell Begle, Ruth Brown, and their allies in government and the entertainment
industries were able to compel some of the record companies they targeted to make some
public and apparently substantial changes.75 Among other things, several major
companies wiped out the suspect “production debts” discussed above, and some doubled
or even tripled royalty rates specified in 1950s contracts, getting them closer to 1980s
averages.76 These “royalty reform” efforts mainly concerned performers whose contracts
pre-dated the 1959 inclusion of recording singers into AFTRA’s H&R Funds, and thus
could only address the behaviors of recording companies in accounting for royalty
payments to individual recording artists and not the behaviors of the Funds, for whom
fiduciary responsibility was definitional. From the perspective of the singers and their
allies (if only in retrospect), the binding of signatory companies to Funds’ reporting and
contribution system added a potentially significant layer of accountability to their
employment relations, as well as a potentially significant source of social security to their
lives.

V. The Moore Case, Royalty Accounting Manipulation, and Audits
In June 1993, at the age of 57, after thirty years in the profession and numerous
hit records, Sam Moore learned from the AFTRA H&R Funds that his pension would
amount to a single lump-sum payment of $2,285.19 (payable when he reached age 65),
and monthly payments of less than $70, guaranteed for up to five years.77 This was
magnitudes less than what he could have expected given his career’s milestones and
longevity. Shortly thereafter, Moore and several other AFTRA singers filed a class-action
suit against AFTRA (the union), a number of record companies, and the AFTRA H&R
Funds. Even sober observers noted at the time that a plaintiff class in this case could
include 10,000 AFTRA singers who had contracted with signatory companies since 1959,
and that such a suit could concern unpaid contributions totaling in the hundreds of
millions of dollars.78 The case against the union and the companies were dismissed, and
the case against the H&R Funds, though denied class certification, was settled in 2002 for
$8.4 million.79 Plaintiffs’ lawyers received about one third of that amount, and the
remaining named plaintiffs (Curtis Mayfield had died, and white singer Brian Hyland
dropped out without public explanation) received payments of $25,000 each. The balance
of funds was to be dedicated to creating a system within the AFTRA H&R Funds
whereby singers’ claims and appeals would be handled more expeditiously and in light of
the patterns of non- and under-payment disclosed during the suit.80 This case reflects
75
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persistent power asymmetries in royalty and contract accounting practices in the cultural
industries.
One key factor in the Moore case was the Funds’ 1989 hiring of a new director,
Frederick Wilhelms III. Wilhelms was the first Funds director to have previous
experience in multi-employer pension plans and the first to join the Funds from outside
the entertainment industry. Almost immediately upon his arrival Wilhelms discovered
major problems, determining that since their inception the Funds had “lacked any
mechanism, procedure, or other means to determine what plan participants worked under
the Phono Code for what employers and for what compensation except for the audits
themselves.”81 Audits were irregularly undertaken, seem always to have discovered
amounts owing (from the thousands to the millions of dollars per company per audit) and
seem only to have ended (and many were never concluded) with settlements for pennies
on the dollar; they were “a terribly inefficient collection device.”82 Audits in fact were the
Funds’ primary, in many cases the only, source of information about members’ covered
earnings, which suggests that the companies were not reporting or making payments as
required and that the Funds were not undertaking their duty to monitor earnings reports
and payments made by recording companies on behalf of recording artists.
In practice, the determination of which AFTRA members had met required
earnings thresholds for health coverage and pension credits was up to the record
companies. Companies could under-contribute to the H&R accounts of commercially
successful artists without threatening those artists’ coverage, but under-contribution of
even a few percent to the accounts of more marginal and less successful (but still valuegenerating) performers could have significant consequences. Where performers’
marginality is racialized such consequences would only be intensified.83
Record companies resist audits. From the standpoint of surplus generation, the
companies’ logic is unassailable. Outside of settlements, few practical legal or
reputational downsides result from recording companies’ withholding royalties. Further,
primary documentary evidence regarding auditing is scanty—audits are highly secret,
rigorously defended against by companies through confidentiality agreements and
settlements that prevent claims from ever reaching a courtroom. Individual artist audits
performed by professional auditors as well as the record company audits performed
periodically by the AFTRA H&R Funds share a distinctive feature: the record companies
appear always to under-report artist earnings. Around 2004, Wilhelms wrote:
After nearly 20 years of involvement with audits on behalf of artists, I have not
seen one that showed a cumulative error in favor of the label [meaning the label
was found to have overpaid and the audit revealed the artist owed the company
money]. I have heard of one from another auditor, but I have no details on it, and
81
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until I actually see them, I consider the rumor to be the Bigfoot sighting of royalty
accounting.84
Independent auditor Fred Wolinsky’s 2002 testimony before a committee of the
California State Legislature hits a strikingly similar note:
I’ve done over 500 audits. You can count on one hand the number of audits that
[resulted] in findings that were paid by the record company that weren’t in excess
of my fees [typically in the tens of thousands of dollars]. All the rest of them were
in excess of my fees and in some cases ten and twenty times.85
Both Wilhelms and Wolinsky, from their very different institutional backgrounds and
positions, encountered the same situation, and found themselves constrained by the
companies’ power to resist full accountings and fuller settlements.
A major turning point in the suit occurred in May 2002 when, under the authority
of its new National Executive Director, Greg Hessinger, AFTRA (the union) intervened
to prevent a proposed settlement that would, among other things, have prohibited all
future claims by AFTRA singers of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Hessinger told Variety
that the “proposed settlement is manifestly unfair to artists.” “There is no question,” he
continued,
that the funds and the named plaintiffs have a right to settle their litigation at a
price they deem appropriate. But when that price includes sacrificing the rights of
thousands of artists who have never had a voice in this suit, AFTRA has a duty to
give those artists a voice.86
In June of 2002, Hessinger told a committee of the California State Legislature that the
H&R Funds’ system for monitoring earnings and enforcing contributions, “as it is
structured now, is so ambiguous, is so bereft of any transparency, so subjective on the
side of the label, so complex, that…you're always going to have the perception that the
artist is getting robbed.”87 AFTRA’s intervention was crucial to the structure of the final
settlement of the case, which, according to many observers, amounted to an unexpected
success.88

Conclusion
Although privately negotiated, industry contracts are typically based on standard
form contracts that leave all but the most powerful of artists with little ability to make
significant contractual changes through negotiation. The terms and typically process by
which artists sign record contracts have long been a source of significant protests by
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artists over an extended time period. Royalty payment structures today continue to reflect
the risk sharing aspects of author payments evident in the early days of book publishing.
Royalty payments in the music industry are often complex and non-transparent.
Part of this lack of transparency is a consequence of significant institutional changes
within the cultural industries during the last few decades. Publishing companies, sheet
music firms, and recording firms were once separate industries that were much smaller in
scale than is typically the case today. Many of these firms are now contained within
industry vast conglomerates with multiple strands of activity. The range of rights that
music and publishing industry firms manage is often far more extensive than would have
been the case in an earlier era, resulting in greater revenue streams from varied licensing
sources.89
Recording contracts and other cultural industry contracts that require profit or risk
sharing involve calculations that determine how much artists are paid. These calculations
are problematic in a number of important respects. The firms undertaking royalty
calculations will typically benefit if they pay out lower amounts of royalties. Paying
lower royalties could permit cultural industry firms to retain a larger share relative to
each artist bound by an industry contract. This gives industry firms incentive to deprive
artists of royalties. Although likely not as egregious as what occurs in Hollywood where
even the most successful of movies often fail to make a profit, at least as defined
contractually, industry payments of royalties present a problem for many artists. In the
recording industry, where entitlement to union healthcare and retirement benefits depend
largely on royalty calculations, artists’ problems are intensified. Cultural industry firm
incentives are further skewed to underpay artists by current industry institutional
structures. Cultural industry firms typically combine multiple strands of activities under
one firm umbrella. This means that some of the expenses that are charged against artist
royalties may be payable to sister firms within the conglomerate structure. This gives
firms further incentive to underpay artists because they benefit to the detriment of artists
being forced to pay for additional costs. Music industry firms have significant discretion
and are often not sufficiently accountable for these types of practices.
Music industry royalty practices, such as those revealed in the archival evidence
brought to light in this chapter, highlight potential problems with contractual accounting.
Royalty contractual accounting numbers may not be correct or calculated in a transparent
or fair way, which results in a situation that leaves significant room for exploitation of a
wide range of artists. Even if an artist is aware that royalty figures are not correct, the
artist may not have much recourse. In the nineteenth century, the activities of industrial
companies highlighted the need for better audits to encourage investment in such
enterprises by equity and debt investors. In contrast, audit procedures for contractual
accounting are not robust. This may be in part a result of labor conditions within the
cultural industries more generally. Although standard form industry contracts typically
permit audits to occur, audits are typically at the expense of the artist seeking an audit.
Because audits are expensive, audits are not always feasible.
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In addition to outlining basic conditions and features of twentieth-century record
industry royalty accounting, this chapter has aimed to identify and make use of neglected
sources and types of evidence, and to indicate avenues of reform. One avenue for
improving the conditions under which artists work in the cultural industries would be to
borrow from the development of audit services in from the financial accounting arena.
Such models could be used to develop more effective audit practices within cultural
industry contractual accounting that would give those calculating royalty payments better
incentive to do the correct calculations and fairly compensate those entitled to royalties in
accordance with relevant contract terms.
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